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One might make the claim with some justice that every act a speaker 
performs of choosing a word in a discourse is an act of propaganda. Sometimes 
the propaganda is deliberate, sometimes unconscious; sometimes overt, some- 
times covert. But generally if we are at all careful speakers or writers, when 
we use a word we hope it means what we want it to mean: no more no less; 
we hope to create a specific effect. 
I am, of course, speaking only about content words, and ,probably, to be 
fair, only a subset of these, those that involve judgments by speaker or hearers 
about the subject of the discourse. But in this category, it is extremely difficult 
to avoid “loading” your language-you must express your opinion willy-nilly, 
and the only questions to be asked are: what is your opinion? and, how 
strongly do you want to express it? On the basis of the answers to these 
questions you will decide what words you want to use. 
And obviously, the wrong choice can be dangerous, sometimes only to 
the extent of frustrating the speaker and confusing his listeners, as he tries 
to make his point; but we all can think of cases where the wrong choice of a 
word threw politics into u-pheavals or influenced large classes of people in 
undesired ways; or, conversely, where the precisely right word accomplished 
what armies could not. So one must know how one’s words will be received. 
The only problem is that one is not necessarily born with this knowledge, 
nor does one necessarily even acquire it fully in the normal course of language 
acquisition. And it often happens that even a speaker who considers himself 
relatively sophisticated in the arts of word-magic will be uncertain about the 
precise meaning of a particular word: is it good? bad? strong? weak? does it 
make special assumptions? is it neutral or somehow ‘loaded‘? pedantic? casual? 
To put it in a nutshell-what is the likely reaction to the use of this word, 
and how would this change if another, more or less synonymous, word were 
substituted? Of course, what we find as we hunt around seeking effect or safety 
is that there are no synonyms. Every word has its own ambience, and we 
must pick carefully among the choices at hand-there are right ones and 
wrong ones, and seemingly trivial distinctions loom large when important 
matters are at issue. So what is our speaker (or writer) to do? He doesn’t want 
to be an ignoramus, or a firebrand, or a bore, or a pedant . . . he wants to 
say just what he means, but he isn’t sure which word of several related ones 
to select. Where does he go for advice? 
About the only avenue open to him is the dictionary. The dictionary, he 
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has learned in school, tells what words mean. Well, that’s just what he wants 
to know! 
What I want to look at now is what happens when our hypothetical 
propagandist consults his dictionary. To what extent, and in what ways, does 
it help him find what he needs to know? And if to some degree it fails, is this 
failure to be expected? What can we expect from a dictionary? What ought 
its function to be? What can’t a dictionary do, and why? 
We should, at the outset, distinguish the different aspects of the meaning of 
lexical items, so that later we can see which ones a dictionary entry normally 
takes cognizance of, which it ignores. We must first separate the denotation or 
assertion from the connotation or pragmatic presupposition. Consider, then, a 
word like the verb know, as in sentence ( 1 ) : 
(1 )  Bill knows that Nixon is President. 
verb: 
(2) Bill believes that Nixon is President. 
Now in both these sentences we are, essentially, asserting the same thing 
of Bill: that he thinks Nixon is President. As far as assertion goes, then, these 
two sentences might be synonyms. But of course they aren’t, and the reason 
they aren’t is that the assumptions each makes about the truth of Bill’s 
thoughts are different. In ( l ) ,  it is implicit-that is, pragmatically (and other- 
wise) presupposed-that the assertion is justifiable : the speaker “goes along” 
with Bill in his belief. 
But in (2) the speaker is at best neutral: he doesn’t take a stand on the 
correctness of Bill’s belief. If it later transpires that Nixon was, at the time 
of the speaking of (1) or (2),  actually not President, one might accuse the 
speaker of (1)  of being himself mistaken, along with Bill. With (2),  the 
speaker is not subject to the charge. But notice that, even in a supposedly 
“neutral” sentence like (2) ,  the speaker can get in trouble: if indeed it is 
universally accepted at the time I say sentence (2) (as it probably is at the 
time I write this paper) that Nixon is in fact President, the use of this sentence 
is rather peculiar. My use of believe-in effect, my begging the question as 
to the truth of the assertion, Nixon is  President-when in fact I and everyone 
else knows the assertion is true raises nagging doubts in the hearer’s mind. 
It suggests, in fact, that 1, the speaker, suspect that Nixon is nor President, 
and that Bill is in fact wrong. This connotation is absent in sentences involving 
a less-than-universally held assumption, like (3) : 
(3) Bill believes that Nixon is a warmonger. 
In this sentence, the use of the verb believe implies that the speaker really 
is neutral about Bill’s belief. The contrast between (2) and (3) indicates 
that words can change their connotations depending upon the assumptions 
normally made in the community of speakers among whom the word is used. 
A word appropriate under one set of cultural or societal assumptions becomes 
odd under another. And similarly, while saying (1) is unlikely to get anyone 
into much trouble with anyone at present, saying (4) will endanger a speaker 
in many circles (and endear him in others) where (3) will not cause his 
hearers to have any reaction. 
Let us contrast this with another sentence, using a somewhat different 
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(4) Bill knows Nixon is a warmonger. 
I have pointed out certain differences in the meanings of the two lexical 
items know and believe. Both assert that the subject of the verb entertains a 
belief. Know further presupposes the truth of that belief. A dictionary clearly 
ought to distinguish these verbs to this extent. Whether it ought to make 
still other distinctions, and to what extent it ought to make this one, is a 
question we shall examine in more detail below. 
It is of interest to the practical as well as the theoretical lexicographer, 
however, how many things besides the denotative meaning (assertive force) 
of a word go to comprise its lexical meaning. We have discussed pragmatic 
presupposition and socially-related assumption. Related to the latter are other 
ways in which the interactions between members of a society-apparently 
nonlinguistic information--affect the interpretation of a lexical item by its 
hearers. We must remember that words, and larger discourses, are used to 
create an effect, and the meaning of a word in its strict denotative sense 
creates only part of that effect; the rest is supplied by social and environmental 
factors, and it is here that one can get into the most trouble by ignoring 
seemingly peripheral issues. 
There are, as Gricel has shown, rules of conversation, which speakers 
follow much as they follow rules of grammar; deviations are noticed and 
punished, one way or another. Related to these are rules of politeness, again 
normally adhered to. One example of a rule of conversation, and a possibility 
for violating it, has been discussed already. We noted earlier that sentence 
(3) was, in the context of today’s real-life world, somehow aberrant although 
no one’s assumptions about the real world were violated. The reason why 
this is true is that there is a rule of conversation that reads, approximately, 
“Say all that you mean.” To say less, to understate, in some kinds of cases, 
is to imply that you mean less. If we are talking about something that is 
universally assumed to be true, the speaker, in forming sentences like (1)- 
(4), must somehow take cognizance of this universal assumption in the verb 
he uses; if he fails, even by oversight, the result will be as though he were 
implying his oversight was somehow purposeful. If such a law of conversation 
is violated, the hearer will search for some way to reconcile the aberrant use 
with his normal assumptions, and will find, if he can, an interpretation that 
renders the use non-aberrant-in this case, he will most likely arrive at an 
interpretation implying that the supposed universal truth is, according to some 
arcane knowledge only the speaker is privy to, not really true. 
We also must know whether we are speaking politely or not. Normally, the 
rules of proper behavior require that we be as polite as possible, that we do not 
create offense in the way we speak-though there are special circumstances in 
which these rules too are relaxed. Also, there are degrees of politeness, and 
one must know the degree expected of one. Different lexical items will be 
appropriate depending on how polite one chooses to be. In languages like 
Japanese, distinctions between words on the basis of politeness extend through- 
out the vocabulary; it is almost impossible to utter a sentence without making 
explicit the level of politeness to which one is adhering. In English, only 
select lexical items are graded according to politeness, but the penalties for 
misuse are still strong. Words apparently synonymous-and so defined-are 
sometimes only denotationally so, one being politer than another. 
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There are numerous forms politeness takes in English, only some of which 
are of immediate interest to the lexicographer. We can mention a few. 
First, there is euphemism. If we feel uncomfortable with a general concept, 
we will invent a euphemism for it. Correlated with euphemisms are derogatory 
expressions. So often, in these cases, we have a triple: derogatory expression- 










IV. broad V. gobble VI. murder VII. admit 
woman eat kill acknowledge 
lady consume exterminate take credit for 
In some of these cases-I, 111, IV, V-to use the top word on the list 
is to commit an act of impropriety under conditions where polite behavior is 
expected. In the other cases, to use the top word on the list is not an act of 
impoliteness, but rather is an admission that the act under discussion is not 
thought of as a good act. In the “impolite” cases this is also frequently true: 
an “impolite” word is such precisely because it expresses the speaker’s distaste 
for the concept, while the neutral word attempts to render it colorless, and the 
euphemism is used to give the word good connotations. Whether a word will 
be considered polite or impolite, euphemistic or derogatory, will change with 
time and cultural assumptions, and may vary from individual to individual. 
So a lot of people have grown up with the idea that it was vulgar to use the 
words sweat or stink. But more recently, these words have been shorn of 
their bad connotations in the usage of many people, and their euphemisms- 
perspire in particular-have started to seem like jokes at the expense of the 
overrefined. What is one to do about such items in the dictionary? And, as a 
more theoretical question, how are we to deal with this sort of semantic change, 
in which a word loses its bad connotations through societal evolution? How is 
this related to non-socially motivated change in the non-denotational meaning 
of lexical items, which is also quite frequent. It is general knowledge that the 
word egregious once meant “conspicuous,” with go good or bad overtones. 
But at present it means “conspicuously bad.” The denotation has now become 
part of the connotative meaning, or pragmatic presupposition, and the new 
denotative sense is “bad.” We all can imagine mechanisms for describing 
denotative meaning-change; but formal description of changes in the connota- 
tive and contextual senses of words is harded to imagine. 
While this is not in itself a problem for the practical lexicographer, there 
are plenty of related questions that are problems for everyone who deals with 
word-meanings. To return to the question of societal context, everyone knows 
there are words that cannot be used by everyone or cannot be used every- 
where. Impolite words are one example of the latter type. Pedantic words 
are another. Just as it is inappropriate to say, normally, ( S ) ,  it is equally 
bad in a different way to say (6) ,  since in both cases the speaker means (7), 
and would generally be expected to say it. 
( 5 )  Wolf down some more cake. 
(6) Ingest some more cake. 
(7) Eat some more cake. 
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Most dictionaries, quite properly, have ways of indicating that words are 
substandard or restricted to certain groups, by economic or geographic areas. 
Everyone knows the impression he would make by saying aint, and most people 
know it marks you as a New Yorker to be heard saying sliding pond for slide. 
There are other marked vocabulary items, perhaps more dangerously restricted: 
to use a word like adorable marks one, in many social groups, as either a 
woman or a homosexual. To say doggie marks one as a child, or childish 
person. If slang, substandard, and (geographic) dialectal terms are typically 
so indicated in dictionaries, these others probably ought also to be marked 
somehow. 
It is also true that a single lexical item may change the normal relationship 
between its denotation and connotation under special stress. Examples like 
the following have been discussed by Fillmore: 
(8) I didn’t blame J6hn for dropping the bomb. 
(9) I didn’t blame John for dropping the bomb. 
The only difference in the superficial forms of these sentences is in their 
stress: (8) has “normal” stress, falling on John; (9) has special stress on 
blame. In (8) ,  the word blame asserts that the act (of dropping the bomb) 
was a bad thing, and presupposes it was John who did it. In (9) it is just the 
reverse: stressed blame presupposes that the act was bad, and asserts that it 
was John who did it. (Of course, in these sentences blame is negated, so that the 
final interpretation of the assertion is the reverse in both cases). NOW we have 
a single word, phonologically speaking, which, in different environments behaves 
semantically very differently.’ Shall we treat it as two lexical items, blame 1 and 
blame 2? No dictionary I know of does this, and no sane linguist would 
suggest doing this-in either a theoretical or practical treatment. There is a 
systematic relationship between the placement of stress and the relationship 
between the presupposition and the assertion. Fillmore has convincingly 
demonstrated this for one class of verbs, the verbs of judging; it can be shown 
to hold for many other classes as well. We don’t have to treat blame as two 
words, since we can relate the two uses in the grammar. But there should 
be some way to take note of these different senses of blame. Some dictionaries 
have found ingenious ways of expressing the distinction. Among the numerous 
words of judging, only some exhibit this switch under stress. Others have only 
one of the two meanings. The verb censure on the one hand, and the expression 
place the responsibility for---on, hold responsible for  on the other, are in 
this relationship: censure is like stressed blcfme, the expressions with responsible, 
responsibility like unstressed blame. 
(10) I didn’t hold John responsible for dropping the bomb. 
( 1 1 ) I didn’t censure John for dropping the bomb. 
While neither of these expressions is a perfect equivalent of blame, they are 
parallel to the two sense of blame in terms of the relationship between assertion 
and presupposition we have discussed. (10) is close in this sense to (8)  but 
not (9); (11) is reasonable equivalent of (9), but not (8). One dictionary 
at least 5 employs this distinction in listing two meanings of blame: 
5 All dictionary entries cited are from Webster’s Seventh New Znternational Dic- 
tionary, 1963. Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co. 
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blame. . . . 1. to find fault with: CENSURE 2a: to hold responsible 
for [- him for everything] b: to place responsibility for [- s it on me] 
While there is no mention of the role of stress ip this dictionary entry, it 
does manage to distinguish correctly between the possible meanings of blame. 
So a dictionary can deal with presuppositions, of some kinds at least, sometimes 
at least. 
But in other respects the dictionary is often less satisfactory, sometimes 
more than others. So often dictionaries lump together words that are similar 
or identical in denotation, but not in presupposition: One dictionary calls 
stubborn a synonym of pigheaded. If this were indeed the case, the following 
two sentences would be identical in sense and in the conditions under which 
they were appropriately used. 
(12) He tried stubbornly to better himself. 
(13) He tried pigheadedly to better himself. 
(12) implies merely that he struggled against difficult odds, in the face of 
great opposition. It can and perhaps usually is complimentary, and can 
perfectly well be used if the subject eventually did succeed. (13), on the other 
hand, suggests that the subject was struggling against really, rather than only 
apparently, insuperable odds: the speaker makes the assumption that the 
struggle was stupid and doomed to failure. In (13), the normal assumption 
would be that the subject eventually failed, since the speaker assumes that it 
was stupid of him even to try. So (12) might be used, for instance, of Abraham 
Lincoln; it would be most odd to use (13) so (for a modem biographer). A 
dictionary must do better than this, since this pairing of these two words, 
without explanation, can easily cause one to use one of them or both of them 
wrong. It may be argued that "everyone knows the difference." But if 
everyone does, why have a dictionary at all? We shall have more to say 
later about who benefits, and how, from the dictionary; but it is always im- 
portant not to lead anyone astray. 
Sometimes, in this regard, a dictionary does very well. The same dictionary 
that did a bad job on pigheaded and stubborn, under pigheaded, makes these 
distinctions quite beautifully (omitting pigheaded) under obstinare. 
Syn OBSTINATE, DOGGED, STUBBORN, PERTINACIOUS, MULISH 
mean fixed and unyielding in course or purpose. OBSTINATE implies 
usu. a perverse or unreasonable persistence; DOGGED suggests a tenacious 
frequently sullen persistence; STUBBORN implies sturdiness in resisting 
attempts to change or abandon a course or opinion; PERTINACIOUS 
suggests an annoying or irksome persistence; MULISH implies a 
thoroughly unreasonable obstinacy. 
Notice that in this comparison most of the important points of contrast are 
covered, clearly and succinctly. First, the attitude of the speaker toward the 
action: the use of sturdy, a word with good connotations with stubborn 
(hence a sentence like (12) above is possible) (of course, one also has to 
know the normal connotations of the words used in the definitions!); annoying 
or irksome, with pertinacious; that is, connotations suggestive of the speaker's 
normal attitude; and connotations suggesting the manner in which the act is 
performed: sullen, for instance, with PERTINACIOUS. Now if we know 
(from outside the dictionary) the normal rules of politeness, we know that 
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normally we do not gratuitously say bad things about our addressee, though 
we might about someone else. So (14) is more normal than (15), while (16) 
is a normal sentence, under the correct situations. 
(14) You are stubborn. 
(15) You are mulish. 
( 16) He is mulish. 
Of course, if driven to exasperation, one might well use (IS); but the very 
definition of “exasperation” suggests a state of mind in which conventions of 
politeness are purposely or otherwise abandoned. So our knowledge of real- 
world politeness conventions, and further knowledge of when they are 
abandonable, coupled with additional purely linguistic knowledge that enables 
us to differentiate between stubborn and mulish, allows us to use these words 
in the right place. But we must know more than merely what the dictionary 
tells us in order to know how to talk, in this instance. There are other 
instances too in which one cannot hope to rely on the dictionary alone: 
consider how it is that we know that sentences like (17)-( 19) are reasonable, 
while (20) is aberrant. 
(17) Since John is a congressman, he can easily afford that $1,000,000 house. 
( 18) Since John is a congressman, he can introduce that bill. 
( 19) Since John is a congressman, he is over 25 years old. 
(20) Since John is a congressman, he is bald. 
A dictionary will define congressman as “a member of Congress” or “of the 
House of Representatives,” and further define Congress as “the legislative body 
of the US government,” or some such. This is about all we expect a dictionary 
to do, but notice that it gives us no help at all with the four sentences above: 
it doesn’t tell us how the first three differ from the fourth, or among them- 
selves. Yet this knowledge is somehow incorporated into the definition of 
congressman. This brings up the question of what we can expect from a 
dictionary definition. One’s first thought, perhaps instilled by the elementcry 
school teacher who taught us about the dictionary in the first place, is that a 
definition somehow tells us all we need to know in order to use a word 
appropriately. But even superficial consideration shows us that this is not true, 
probably should not be true. All the examples given above attest to the fact that 
it is not true that a definition tells us how to use a word. Further, a dictionary 
definition does not tell us what a word means, in any comprehensive sense, 
since if it did, it would also automatically tell us how to use it appropriately. 
In many of the examples given already, the dictionary entry tells us less than 
we need to know: the untutored Martian arriving on earth could not consult 
the unabridged dictionary at the library and henceforth speak English like a 
native (even assuming he had elsewhere acquired a knowledge of English 
syntax); he would be unaware of presuppositions of many types, such as the 
ones distinguishing know and believe, or eat and gobble; he would be unaware 
of the rules of conversation and of politeness, and how they alter and affect 
the usability of dictionary entries in various social environments. And he 
would be unable to tell which of the sentences (17)-(20) were normal 
sentences of English, and how they were interpretable when they were. 
None of the sentences (17)-(20) is interpretable from the dictionary 
definition. Perhaps, it may be suggested, an encyclopedia would provide help: 
telling us about real-world functions and uses is a job done by an encyclopedia, 
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not a dictionary. Hays suggests that a dictionary supplies denotative definitions 
of words, an encyclopedia connotative. But we have seen that, in order to 
give any idea how a word is used, very often a dictionary must provide some 
information about connotations; and of course an encyclopedia must talk about 
denotation to be intelligible at all. In the case of congressman, though, even 
an encyclopedia would tell us that a congressman’s job is to introduce bills 
(or the like), and that to be a congressman one must be over 25 years old. 
Hence, from these definitions we see how the sentences (18) and (19) make 
sense. But there will be no provision in the normal encyclopedia for dis- 
tinguishing between (17), which is a reasonable if cynical utterance, and 
(20),  which is nonsense. Here we must resort to some notion of real-world 
knowledge one somehow acquires about the dealings of congressmen, covered 
neither by a knowledge of their constitutional duties nor the eligibility require- 
ments for running for congress. In the real-world situation of the U.S. 
government, we know that sometimes, as an indirect result of his officially 
delegated powers, a congressman can become very rich; but normally there is 
no reason to suppose that any function of a congressman causes him to become 
bald. But this is real-world knowledge, not a part of the definition of congress- 
man in a dictionary or an encyclopedia. This example shows that there are 
aspects of meaning that cannot be treated in any reference work, that meaning 
goes beyond a formal definition of appearance, duties, privileges, etc. 
Sometimes a dictionary definition seems both to tell more than is needed 
by the normal English-speaking user, and less than needed by our naive 
Martian. One example is the definition, in the dictionary we have been citing, 
of egg: 
la: the hardshelled reproductive body produced by a bird and esp. by 
domestic poultry; b: an animal reproductive body consisting of an ovum 
together with its nutritive and protective envelopes and being capable 
of developing into a new individual capable of independent existence. 
c: OVUM 2: something resembling an egg 3 slang: FELLOW, GUY 
Normally, one thinks of an egg as a food. This definition fails to mention 
this, and hence, fails to define the concept egg in a useful way. 
But, the dictionary maker protests, he is not making up a dictionary for 
the naive Martian. He need not indicate that know is factive, because the 
normal speaker of English capable of using a dictionary at all knows this 
already; similarly he knows that an egg is good for eating. But he may not 
know the reproductive function of an egg, and he may not know how the 
meaning of stubborn differs precisely from that of mulish, and he may need 
to know the meanings of words somewhat out of the ordinary: frigorific, 
ineptitude, probang, strabismus, to select a few at random; or he may need 
to know the number of m’s and t’s in committee. Surely the typical user of a 
dictionary consults it for reasons like this, and it is only the picayune pro- 
fessional linguist who wonders about the treatment of know and gobble and egg. 
The job of the practical dictionary-maker is to reduce semantically complex 
forms to a combination of atomic elements; so egregious, a complex concept, is 
broken down into two simpler notions: conspicuous + bud, words with which 
the person consulting the dictionary is apt to be familiar, and some sort of 
clues (here, the adverbial form conspicuously indicates that this concept is 
presupposed, and the adjectival bad shows that this concept is asserted) to the 
relationship among these more-or-less atomic elements. But when it comes to 
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defining these simpler elements themselves, the dictionary-maker is in greater 
difficulties. This is obvious in the definition of egg, where an essentially atomic 
element is defined by more complex elements. The dictionary-maker can, 
for practical purposes, assume that anyone who has a need to look up 
egregious knows the meaning of bad; but in a theoretical sense, the dictionary 
should also give the meaning of bad. Does it? 
bad la: below standard: POOR b: UNFAV0RABLE (- impression) 
c: DECAYED, SPOILED 2a: morally evil b: MISCHIEVOUS, DIS- 
OBEDIENT 3: INADEQUATE (- lighting) 4: DISAGREEABLE, 
UNPLEASANT (- news) 5a: INJURIOUS, HARMFUL b: SEVERE 
(-cold) 6: INCORRECT, FAULTY (-grammar) 7: ILL, SICK 
(feel -1 8: SORROWFUL, SORRY 9: INVALID, VOID 
As is evident, all the “definitions” of bad involve semantically more complex 
and more restricted notions than the word itself being defined. So the dic- 
tionary sense of “definition” really is not a simple thing: when a complex word 
is being defined, it is broken down into simpler elements; when a simple word 
is defined, it is defined in terms of more complex elements. In most cases, 
assumptions and presuppositions of the kinds we have been discussing are 
either ignored completely or left to be inferred from information given, rather 
than stated directly; but even our Martian friend would be at a loss trying to 
figure out the meanings of most words from their dictionary definitions. 
But our poor Martian would be equally at a loss consulting a pedagogical 
grammar of English to learn how to do English syntax, assuming Martians 
had none of the concepts of universal syntax and semantics shared by the 
speakers of all languages spoken on Earth. In writing a pedagogical grammar, 
there are of course numerous things we don’t say: we don’t, for instance, say 
that the coordinate structure constraint is in effect in English. We don’t, 
therefore, feel a need to point out that sentences like (21) cannot be said in 
English even though they are, theoretically, semantically interpretable: 
(21) Who did the boys Fred knows see John and? 
pedagogical grammar of English warns the reader not to say (22) : 
(22) Tomorrow I saw John. 
And these omissions, among others, distinguish a pedagogical grammar from 
a theoretical grammar, which, in one way or another, must somewhere provide 
the information above. Also, a theoretical grammar typically is assumed to 
break sentences down to their logically “underlying” forms. A theoretical 
grammar would provide the underlying phrase marker (FIGURE 1) for the 
superficial sentence “Floyd broke the glass.” (Of course, this tree is most 
inadequate and approximate, even in terms of what we know now, let alone 
what we eventually hope to know; but it is the best we can do, for present 
purposes.) A pedagogical grammer could not, and should not, supply such 
information: its user has no need of it, need not know about abstract elements, 
logical underlying forms, and so on. 
So a pedagogical grammar tells us much less than we innately know about 
the “grammar” of a language. Similarly, a dictionary tells us much less than 
we innately know about the “meanings” or words. In fact, the omissions in 
We don’t have to say that numerous semantic restrictions are in force: no 
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both are very much the same. We should perhaps look at a dictionary as a 
non-theoretical lexicon, as a pedagogical grammar is a non-theoretical grammar. 
A theoretical lexicon tells us all that a dictionary does not: it breaks mean- 







happen ‘ //9 
s Floyd 
I Floyd 
FIGURE 1. “Floyd broke the glass.” 
ings into their atomic elements, to such an extent that no word contained in a 
practical dictionary would remain in that form in the lexicon, but would be 
broken down considerably; it is unlikely that there exists in any language 
any lexical item truly atomic in meaning, and the many abstract elements (such 
164 Annals New York Academy of Sciences 
as past in FIGURE 1) that are found in logical structures have no superficial 
form in the dictionary, though they would be found in the lexicon (just as 
they exist in the theoretical grammar, not in the pedagogical grammar). In 
both dictionary and pedagogical grammar, universal elements, things a speaker 
innately knows, are omitted, while they are part of the theoretical grammar and 
the lexicon. 
What we conclude from this is that one must have two notions of meaning 
(or definition) as one must have two notions of grammar. The dictionary- 
maker, like the pedagogical grammarian, is concerned with those that are not 
a basic part of the human conceptual system. The purpose of a dictionary, 
as of a pedagogical grammar, is to fill in what the speaker cannot be expected to 
know already, the information the speaker does not bring to the book. Neither 
is the tool for the naive Martian. The naive Martian, on the other hand, will 
make good use of the theoretical grammar and the lexicon. These will tell 
him everything he needs to know, all the innate knowledge possessed and 
intuitively used by the human being. If the naive Martian finds either of 
these, he is requested to bring them to the nearest theoretical linguist, who 
has been looking for them for a long time and needs them badly. 
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DISCUSSION 
MR. FRANCIS: It occurred to me, apropos of semantic change, that a good 
many of the items about which there has been the greatest weeping and wailing 
over the degeneration of the language have changed in just this peripheral 
area of meaning, rather than in denotative meaning. One example is enormity, 
whose older meaning always was pejorative. One talked about the enormity 
of the crime, and so on. But I increasingly hear enormity being used just 
in the sense of enormousness, which always shocks me, because I feel this 
should always be a pejorative word, and it is often not so used. People speak, for 
example, about the enormity of the mortgage. 
